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ABSTRACT
Through real-life experiments, it has been proved that spoofing is a
practical threat to applications using the free civil service provided
by Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS).
In this paper, we demonstrate a prototype that can verify the in-
tegrity of GNSS civil signals. By integrity we intuitively mean
that civil signals originate from a GNSS satellite without having
been artificially interfered with. Our prototype provides interfaces
that can incorporate existing spoofing detection methods whose re-
sults are then combined into an overall evaluation of the signal’s
integrity, which we call integrity level. Considering the various se-
curity requirements from different applications, integrity levels can
be calculated in many ways determined by their users. We also
present an application scenario that deploys our prototype and of-
fers a public central service – localisation assurance certification.
Through experiments, we successfully show that our prototype is
not only effective but also efficient in practice.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and protection
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GNSS signal; signal integrity; spoofing
1. INTRODUCTION
The free access to the civil localisation service of Global Nav-
igation Satellite Systems (GNSS) has been popularising numer-
ous location-based applications which have penetrated into peo-
ple’s daily life from leisure activities, such as geo-social networks,
to safety-critical products, such as driverless cars. However, differ-
ent from military signals, civil GNSS signals are neither signed nor
encrypted. This leads to the problem that their originators cannot
be authenticated. Besides this, due to the weak strength when trans-
mitted in the open air, they can be easily taken over by false signals.
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Such attacks are called spoofing [4]. It has been demonstrated by
a number of scientific experiments (e.g., see [3]) that receivers can
be fooled by spoofed signals to calculate wrong locations.
Navigation message authentication is considered as an effective
method to prevent spoofing attacks. However, this is not feasible in
the near future due to the difficulties to upgrade the current GNSS
infrastructure. Although the European GNSS – Galileo is plan-
ning to offer authenticated civil services, it is not free and also not
accessible to everybody. In the literature, a number of methods
have been proposed aiming to detect spoofing instead of preventing
spoofing. A spoofing detection method usually makes use of an ob-
servable feature of GNSS signals that should be present when they
are not spoofed. The absence of the feature will lead to an alarm
of spoofing. Otherwise, a claim of signal integrity will be issued.
For instance, as integrous signals have signal strength smaller than
-153.5 dBW, given a signal with a larger power the corresponding
spoofing detection method will conclude that the signal is spoofed.
Spoofing detection methods explore two inference rules. For in-
stance, when signal strength is used, they are formulated as follows:
signal strength ≤ −153.5 dBW → the signal received is integrous;
signal strength > −153.5 dBW → the signal received is spoofed.
Meanwhile, these inference rules can also be interpreted as the
causal relations between the precedents and the conclusions, e.g.,
whether the strength is smaller than -153.5 dBW and whether the
signal is integrous, respectively.
However, these inference rules do not capture the correct causal
relations between observed features and signal integrity. For ex-
ample, signal strength is a physical attribute of GNSS signals. Its
value is measured by a certain sensor which takes signals as in-
put. Therefore, if the received signal is integrous then its strength
is smaller than the threshold (-153.5 dBW). However, “the observa-
tion that the signal strength is larger than the threshold implies that
the signal is integrous” is a false statement. Moreover, after having
studied several spoofing detection methods, we concluded that ad-
ditional conditions are required to express the causal relations, as
some observed features are not only caused by the current signal but
are also related to past signals. For instance, users’ future locations
can be predicted based on their current positions and other informa-
tion such as direction and velocity. An existing spoofing detection
method makes use of the distance between the locations calculated
and the predicted ones. Once the distance is small enough, it will
claim integrity of the signal. In fact, the integrity of the current sig-
nal only cannot enforce the small distance. We also need to ensure
the correctness of the prediction which is decided by the integrity
of the past signal used to calculate the past position.
The impacts of environmental noise on attributes of signals are
not fully addressed in the literature. The noise caused by natu-
ral facts such as reflection can lead to significant variance in the
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Figure 1: Main steps to derive an integrity opinion.
measurements of some attributes. Thus, some expected observable
features can be violated even if the signal is not spoofed. A qualita-
tive conclusion, as usually given by the existing spoofing detection
methods, cannot capture uncertainty in such cases.
We proposed a trust framework [1] to evaluate the integrity of
GNSS signals. Informally, a received signal is integrous if it has
originated from a GNSS satellite without having been artificially
interfered with. Our framework provides a formal characterisation
of spoofing detection methods and the causal relationships used by
them. Subjective logic is exploited to infer signal integrity from
observations and it can capture the uncertainty caused by unpre-
dictable environmental noise. This leads to a quantitative opinion
on signal integrity. Subsequently the quantification allows us to
develop meaningful algorithms to combine the outputs of different
spoofing detection methods.
Our contributions. We develop a prototype based on the trust
framework [1] to provide a general software structure to make use
of existing spoofing detection methods. It takes the measurements
of attributes of received signals as input and outputs an overall con-
clusion on the signal integrity. We take into account the diversity of
users’ security requirements and provide a customisable evaluation
process. For instance, users can cater the evaluation according to
the quality of their localising devices and ever-changing environ-
ment. To demonstrate the marketing potentials of our prototype,
we implemented a public service – location assurance certifica-
tion. With extensive experiments, we show that our prototype is
not only effective but also efficient in practice.
2. TRUST FRAMEWORK OVERVIEW
We give a brief introduction to our trust framework [1]. Fig. 1
shows the three steps in the framework to use a spoofing detection
method to check signal integrity. Intuitively, a spoofing detection
method takes a measurement of an attribute of a received signal
(e.g., signal strength) as input and outputs its assessment on the sig-
nal’s integrity which is in the form of a subjective logic opinion. A
subjective logic opinion expresses the belief of an agent on the truth
of a (multiple) proposition(s) [2]. For instance, wAx = (b, d, u, a)
is the opinion ofA on the truth of x, where b, d and u describesA’s
belief, disbelief and uncertainty, respectively; and a is the a priori
probability that x is true. Furthermore, we have b+ d+ u = 1 and
the expectation probability of x being true is calculated as b+a ·u.
A spoofing detection method first calculates a set of predicted
values for an attribute if the signal is integrous, called reference
set. Subsequently, it will check whether the measurement of the at-
tribute of the received signal is in the reference. If it is, the measure-
ment is valid. The output of this step is called valid opinion which
in fact expresses the belief on the presence of an observable feature.
Its calculation captures the impact of environmental noise. The last
step clarifies the causal relationship between the observation of a
received signal and its integrity. For example, with regards to signal
strength, the causal relation is ‘the received signal is integrous →
signal strength ≤ −153 .5 dBW ’. We also identify another type
of spoofing detection methods whose causal relationships contain
past signals’ integrity in the precedent. For example, in the in-
ertial spoofing detection, the causal relationship can be formulated
by if referred past signals and current signal are integrous →
the calculated location is close to the predicted location . These
Receiver
Measurement
Collector
GPS
signal
Data
Manager
Detection
Method 1
Detection
Method n
Data
Keeper
Opinion
Combiner
Integrity
Level
Generator
...
Figure 2: The components of the prototype.
relationships show that the reasoning of signal integrity based on
observed features is abductive but not deductive. The output of this
step is called integrity opinion.
Given multiple spoofing detection methods, for a received signal,
we will obtain multiple integrity opinions. They are different from
each other due to the various features of signal attributes in detect-
ing spoofed signals. Thus, an overall integrity opinion is necessary
to resolve the difference. To combine the different integrity opin-
ions, three algorithms are proposed to meet the various security
requirements of applications – Veto, Consensus and Combined.
The Veto algorithm returns the opinion which indicates the largest
probability of spoofing. It gives conservative results and can be
used in safe-critical applications. However, false alarms of spoof-
ing are quite possible due to the abrupt changes on signal attributes
caused by environmental noise. The Consensus algorithm makes
use of the fusion operation on subjective logic opinions. Intuitively,
it ensures that the integrity opinions with less uncertainty are more
important in the combined opinion. Compared with the Veto al-
gorithm, the Consensus algorithm generates fewer false claims
of spoofing but may output more false claims of integrity, espe-
cially in the case where attackers have more power to tune sig-
nal attributes. The Combined algorithm aims to reach a balance
between false alarms of spoofing and false claims of integrity. It
returns the consensus of VETO opinions which indicate large prob-
abilities of spoofing with small uncertainty. When VETO opinions
do not exist, the Consensus algorithm will be used.
3. PROTOTYPE
We have developed a prototype based on the trust framework.
It collects the measurements of received GPS (Global Positioning
System) signals from receivers in real time and returns the signal
integrity to users in terms of integrity levels.
Our prototype allows a user to customise the integrity evaluation
process according to the real-time environment in order to obtain
more reliable results. First, a user can disable some spoofing de-
tection methods in certain cases when they are likely to calculate
incorrect integrity opinions. For instance, when driving in a for-
est, a user wants to stop using detection methods relying on signal
strength due to the significant fluctuations caused by trees. Second,
a user can choose the algorithm to combine integrity opinions from
different spoofing detection methods according to the service he is
requesting. Last, a user can notify our prototype of the type of his
receiver. This is necessary because receivers may differ in terms
of computation power and antennas. The variants lead to differ-
ent measurements of some attributes even for the same signal. In
our prototype, we make a simple classification – professional and
commercial-off-the-shelf, and assign different values to the a priori
parameters used during the evaluation process.
We show in Fig. 2 the components of our prototype. Upon re-
ceiving a signal, the receiver calculates its location. Meanwhile
the measurement collector (MC) starts gathering the values of the
attributes measured by the receiver during localisation and subse-
quently send them to the data manager (DM). We organise and
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Figure 3: Location Assurance Provider
record the measurements in the form of XML (Extensible Markup
Language) due to its simplicity and generality. The preference of
a user to customise the integrity evaluation is also added, includ-
ing the spoofing detection and combination algorithms to run. The
DM prepares and distributes the input for each spoofing detection
method. Besides the measurements of signal attributes, other infor-
mation is also included in the inputs, such as the integrity opinions
of related past signals and parameters to calculate reference sets.
All such information is stored and managed by the data keeper
(DK). Integrity opinions are calculated by spoofing detection meth-
ods and then sent to the opinion combiner (OC) which calculates
the overall integrity opinion according to the user’s requirement
contained in the XML file. In the end, the combined integrity opin-
ion is transformed into an integrity level between 1 to 5 which is
intuitive and easy for users to understand. Specifically, a signal
is labelled by integrity level i if the expectation probability of the
integrity opinion is between 0.2 · (i− 1) and 0.2 · i.
Note that MC should be installed on the device equipped in the
receiver so as to have access to the measurements of signals (see the
dashed rectangle in Fig. 2). The other components can be deployed
and run on remote agents. However, the communication between
them should be well designed as users’ locations are acknowledged
as an important piece of private information.
4. LOCATION ASSURANCE PROVIDER
To demonstrate our trust framework for evaluating GNSS signal
integrity, we present an implementation of a public service – lo-
cation assurance certification based on our prototype in practice.
Location-based services (LBS) are services customised according
to users’ locations. Delivering a service calculated with a wrong lo-
cation will lead to security concerns such as privacy leakage. Take
location-based local friend search as an example. Users send re-
quests to LBS providers for the list of friends who are close to them
in order to have a common activity. By feeding a user’s device with
false locations, attackers can learn the locations of any friends of
the user which should not be revealed according to the user’s real
location. To fight against such attacks, only to protect users’ device
from malware is not sufficient because spoofing is still possible.
We have implemented a trusted central server called location as-
surance provider (LAP) based on our prototype to evaluate signals’
integrity and issue a certificate on their integrity levels (called loca-
tion assurance certificate). The certificate is then sent to the LBS
provider who will verify and adjust its policy (e.g., stop or con-
tinue) to deliver the service according to the integrity level. Fig. 3
shows the main steps for a user to request an LBS using location as-
surance certification. Before sending a request to the LBS provider,
the user device first collects the measurements of received signals
and contacts the LAP to evaluate their integrity (step (1)). Upon re-
ceiving the location assurance certificate (step (2)), the user sends
an LBS request together with the certificate (step (3)) to the LBS
provider. The provider checks the validity of the certificate and re-
turns the service catered in terms of the integrity level attached (step
(4)). To accomplish the scheme, a public key infrastructure (PKI) is
Table 1: Computation time of a request.
# users 100 200 300 400 500
avg. time (s) 0.1 0.7 2.5 2.6 3.7
required to manage the LAP’s public key. Besides the LAP we also
implement an Android application which runs on users’ mobile de-
vices. In fact, the application works as the measurement collector
(MC in Fig. 2) and takes charge of communicating with the LAP.
We use a 3G telecommunication network to establish the connec-
tion with the LAP. According to our test, the average transition time
of a message is about 2 seconds.
We test the efficiency and effectiveness of the LAP in terms of
computation time and numbers of false conclusions. The LAP is
run on a virtual machine with 4G RAM and an Intel Xeon E5-2640
processor. Tab. 1 shows the average computation time for a request
when different number of users send requests concurrently – it in-
creases when the number of requests gets large. This is because
for a request, the LAP needs two operations on the database (read
parameters and store integrity opinions) which takes about 90% of
the computation time. However, even with the current setting, for
500 requests, we need less than 4 seconds which is still acceptable.
More efficient database techniques can improve the parallelism of
the computation. Fig. 4 shows the distributions of integrity levels
of four spoofing detection methods1 and our three integration algo-
rithms on a dataset of signals which contains about 18% of spoofed
signals. We can see that the integrity opinions vary over the dif-
ferent detection methods and the Combined algorithm gives the
results with the minimum number of false alarm and false claims.
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5. CONCLUSION
We have developed a software prototype to evaluate the integrity
of GNSS signals. It offers a general framework to exploit existing
spoofing detection methods. With this prototype, we implemented
a public service – location assurance certification and illustrated the
marketing potentials of our prototype through experiments.
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